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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sonnie Flores pled guilty to felony eluding.  He 
received a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed, and the court placed 
him on probation.  After a probation violation, the district court retained jurisdiction.  
Following his rider, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  On appeal, Mr. Flores 
contends that the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing its jurisdiction, erred 
in denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion asking to complete 
a rider program because the district court believed it did not have the authority to do so, 
and abused its discretion in failing to place him back on a rider in light of the additional 
information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion. 
   
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In the early morning hours of August 4, 2012, law enforcement observed a car 
being driven by Sonnie Flores illegally crossing multiple lanes while making a left hand 
turn.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.)  When law 
enforcement attempted to stop the car, it sped up and drove away from the officers.  
(PSI, p.3.)  Law enforcement followed the car Mr. Flores was driving, and, during the 
pursuit, Mr. Flores’ car reached an estimated 85-90 miles per hour.  (PSI, p.3.)  
Mr. Flores eventually stopped the car after spike strips were employed.  (PSI, p.3.)  
Officers learned that Mr. Flores’ driver’s license was suspended.  (PSI, p.4.)  Officers 
noticed the odor of alcohol on his breath, but the subsequent breath test was deficient.  
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(PSI, pp.3-4.)  A blood draw was performed.  (PSI, p.4.)  When Mr. Flores was 
searched, officers found marijuana paraphernalia.  (PSI, p.4.)  Based on these facts, 
Mr. Flores was charged by Information with one count of felony eluding.2  (R., pp.61-
63.)   
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Flores pled guilty to the felony eluding.  
(R., pp.84-94.)  As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and that the district court retain jurisdiction.  
(R., pp.84-94.)  The district court accepted the plea, ordered a Presentence 
Investigation and a DUI evaluation and set the matter for sentencing.  (R., pp.83-95.)   
The district court sentenced Mr. Flores to a unified sentence of five years, with 
three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed him on probation for four 
years.  (R., pp.121, 124-136.)   
In 2014, a report of probation violation was filed which alleged that Mr. Flores 
was discharged from his treatment classes, twice used methamphetamine and once 
used marijuana.  (R., pp.140-150.)  Mr. Flores admitting to violating terms and 
conditions of his probation and the district court revoked his probation but then placed 
him back on probation for two years.  (R., pp.183-195.) 
In 2015, the State filed two reports of probation violation which asserted that 
Mr. Flores violated his probation by failing to pay his fines, fees, or restitution; being 
charged with new crimes—domestic battery, resisting and obstructing, and providing 
                                                                                                                                            
1 Appellant’s use of the designation “PSI” includes the packet of documents grouped 
with the electronic copy of the PSI, including the original PSI, the Addendums to the 
PSI, the DUI Evaluation, and letters submitted in support of Mr. Flores. 
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false information; failing to report to his probation officer as instructed; failing to notify 
his probation officer of a change in his residence; absconding; failing to pay his costs of 
supervision; failing to submit to UAs; failing to maintain full-time employment; and 
associating with a person not approved by his probation officer.  (R., pp.197-216, 227-
238.)  Mr. Flores admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his probation, 
and the State agreed not to file new charges relating to law enforcement contact on 
June 6, 2015, pursuant to an agreement.3  (8/7/15 Tr., p.3, L.13 – p.10, L.22; 
R., pp.253-254.)  On August 7, 2015, the district court revoked Mr. Flores’ probation, but 
retained jurisdiction over him for a period of up to 365 days.  (8/7/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-19; 
R., pp.255-260.)  An amended order retaining jurisdiction was entered on September 
18, 2015.  (R., pp.261-266.) 
On December 15, 2015, the district court relinquished jurisdiction without a 
hearing and ordered Mr. Flores to serve the underlying sentence previously imposed.  
(R., pp.267-273.)   
                                                                                                                                            
2 Mr. Flores was also charged with several misdemeanors in Twin Falls County case 
number CR-2012-9084--excessive DUI, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving 
without privileges.  (PSI, p.7.) 
3 The offer-plea agreement filed the day Mr. Flores admitted to violating his probation 
was certainly ambiguous—it contained language from the initial change of plea but also 
incorporated language regarding the pending probation violation.  (R., p.254.)  The 
agreement, drafted by the State, required Mr. Flores to waive events that had already 
happened and purported to be contingent on the waiver of the completion of a form that 
had already been signed and filed several years previously.  (8/7/15 Tr., p.3, Ls.16-19; 
R., p.254.)  See State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 596 (2010) (“Ambiguities in a plea 
agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant.”)  Further, the agreement 
mandated conditions upon the district court, although the district court was not a party to 
the agreement.  (R., p.254.)  The agreement required Mr. Flores to waive his right to file 
a Rule 35 motion from the initial Judgment and appeal any issues, including “any rulings 
made by the court,” however, the use of the past tense indicates that no future waiver 
was intended.  (R., p.254) (emphasis added).  See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 886 
(2013). 
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On December 30, 2015, Mr. Flores filed timely I.C.R. 35 Motion (hereinafter, Rule 
35) asking the district court to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction and 
instruct the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) to re-integrate Mr. Flores into the 
rider program so that he may have an opportunity to complete the program.  
(R., pp.274-278.)   On January 6, 2016, the district court denied Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 
motion without a hearing, holding that another period of retained jurisdiction could not 
be ordered absent an intervening period of probation.  (R., pp.279-281.)  The district 
court’s order denying Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 motion also advised the defendant of his right 
to appeal the order within 42 days.  (R., p.285.)  Mr. Flores timely appealed from the 
order relinquishing jurisdiction and the district court’s order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion.  




1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. Flores? 
 
2. Did the district court err in holding it did not have the authority to retain 
jurisdiction so that Mr. Flores could complete a rider program? 
 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Flores’ Idaho 








The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. Flores 
 
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must 
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. 
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001).  “The decision to place a defendant on probation or 
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of that discretion.”   State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 
2010).  Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court 
reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original 
judgment.  Id. at 289. 
Mr. Flores contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of his successes during his brief period of retained jurisdiction, his 
recognition of a problem, and his desire to make the changes necessary so that this 
type of incident does not happen again. 
Mr. Flores was participating in his programming and had expressed a willingness 
to change his criminal thinking and behavior.  (PSI, pp.48-50.)  Despite his limited 
reading ability, Mr. Flores reads at a fifth grade level,4 Mr. Flores was making progress 
on his assignments and beginning to speak up in classes.  (PSI, pp.48-50.)  Although, 
                                            
4 Mr. Flores was kicked out of school when he was in sixth grade and had not yet 
obtained a GED.  (8/7/15 Tr., p.15, Ls.21-24.) 
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while on his rider, Mr. Flores did receive disciplinary sanctions,5 his rider began “with a 
promising start and his participation in groups was at a high level.”  (PSI, p.50.)  Further, 
Mr. Flores had “professed a desire to end his active addiction to Methamphetamine.”  
(PSI, p.50.)  While Mr. Flores was quiet in group unless called on, he volunteered 
feedback for his peers, and he was able to accept feedback and apply it to his own 
work.  (PSI, p.48.)  However, Mr. Flores was removed from the institution in which he 
was receiving programming during the pendency of an investigation for conduct in 
which he was not involved and was unable to resume programming.  (PSI, pp.47-50.)   
The district court failed to recognize that Mr. Flores’ accomplishments while on 
the retained jurisdiction were limited by the brief two month period of programming 
Mr. Flores participated in prior to being removed from the institution due to a pending 
investigation.  (PSI, pp.52-54.) 
Essentially, Mr. Flores was relinquished because he had been moved to a 
different facility while he was suspected of being involved in a battery that occurred at 
NICI.  (PSI, pp.45-52.) Although he was interviewed but not implicated in any 
wrongdoing (other than associating with persons who were involved in the incident), his 
removal from programming pending the investigation proved detrimental—Mr. Flores 
could not complete the programming he had started due to his early removal from the 
facility.  (PSI, pp.45-52.) 
                                            
5 During a family emergency, Mr. Flores used the PINs of other offenders to place 
telephone calls; this behavior resulted in a formal disciplinary infraction.  (PSI, pp.46-
47.)   
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In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court 
that demonstrates Mr. Flores’ significant rehabilitative potential, the district court abused 
its discretion when relinquished its jurisdiction over Mr. Flores. 
 
                                                          II. 
The District Court Erred When It Held It Did Not Have Authority To Retain Jurisdiction 
So That Mr. Flores Could Complete A Rider Program 
 
The district court erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction to retain jurisdiction and 
order Mr. Flores back into IDOC rider programming. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2601 provides, in relevant part: 
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, 
in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the 
laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its 
discretion may. . . Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time 
during the first three hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the 
custody of the state board of correction.  The court shall retain jurisdiction 
over the prisoner for a period of up to the first three hundred sixty-five 
(365) days.  Except as provided for in section 19-2601A, Idaho Code, 
during the period of retained jurisdiction, the state board of correction shall 
be responsible for determining the placement of the prisoner and such 
education, programming and treatment as it determines to be appropriate.  
The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not 
affirmatively placed on probation by the court. 
 
I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) provides that a defendant may file a motion to reduce 
the sentence within 120 days from when the judgment of conviction is filed or within 120 
days of when the court releases retained jurisdiction.  I.C.R. 35(b); State v. Clontz, 156 
Idaho 787, 792 (Ct. App. 2014).   
Idaho Code Section 19-2601(4) also addresses additional periods of retained 
jurisdiction: 
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The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one (1) 
period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on 
probation in a case . . .  
I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 
On August 7, 2015, the district court revoked Mr. Flores’ probation, but retained 
jurisdiction over him for a period of up to 365 days.  (R., pp.255-260.)  On December 15, 
2015, the district court relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing and ordered Mr. Flores 
to serve the underlying sentence previously imposed.  (R., pp.267-273.)  On 
December 30, 2015, Mr. Flores filed timely Rule 35 seeking a modification of his 
sentence in the form of another opportunity to complete a rider program.  (R., pp.274-
278.)   However, the district court denied Mr. Flores’s Rule 35 motion without a hearing, 
holding that another period of retained jurisdiction could not be ordered absent an 
intervening period of probation.  (R., pp.279-281.) 
In his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Flores requested leniency in the form of an opportunity 
to complete another rider.  (R., pp.274-277.)  The district court denied the request, 
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to place Mr. Flores on another rider, “[h]is sole request 
is for another chance at a Rider, which the court cannot grant.”  (R., pp.281-285.)   
Specifically, the district court held: 
I.C. § 19-2601(4) provides that “[t]he court in its discretion may sentence a 
defendant to more than one (1) period of retained jurisdiction after a 
defendant has been placed on probation . . .”  Idaho’s appellate courts 
have interpreted this language to mean that a court may not place a 
defendant on a second period of retained jurisdiction absent an 
intervening period of probation. State v. Gill, 150 Idaho 183, 186, 244 P.3d 
1269, 1272 (Ct. App. 2010). 
 
(R., p.283.)  However, the court’s holding was erroneous.  The district court had the 
authority to continue Mr. Flores on the same rider (or a new rider) so long as it was 
within the period of retained jurisdiction.  Such is the plain language of I.C. § 19-
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2601(4).  That is, a period of retained jurisdiction is not automatically terminated simply 
because the Idaho Department of Corrections sends the defendant back to court with a 
“relinquish” recommendation.   
During a “period of retained jurisdiction” a defendant typically receives 
programming called a “rider,” however, the terms are not interchangeable.  For 
example, during a 365 day period of retained jurisdiction, a defendant could potentially 
complete one or more rider programs within the 365 day period.  (See PSI, p.45 
(describing Mr. Flores’ “Rider” Type as an “Extended 180-Day ‘Rider’”).)  However, the 
district court in this case found that it could not retain jurisdiction over Mr. Flores absent 
an intervening period of probation.  What the district court misunderstood was that, it 
could have gone back to the order relinquishing and continued to retain jurisdiction over 
Mr. Flores and ordered him to receive rider programming while in the custody of the 
Idaho Department of Corrections.  See I.C. § 19-2601(4) (“during the period of retained 
jurisdiction, the state board of correction shall be responsible for determining the 
placement of the prisoner and such education, programming and treatment as it 
determines to be appropriate.”) 
 In holding that it lacked jurisdiction to order a second period of retained 
jurisdiction, the district court relied on the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Gill; 
however, the facts of Gill are easily distinguished.  150 Idaho 183 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding that the “plain meaning of ‘after a defendant has been placed on probation in a 
case’ from I.C. § 19-2601(4) leads us to conclude that a district court may order a 
second period of retained jurisdiction only after a defendant has been placed on an 
intervening period.”)  In Gill, the defendant filed a Rule 35 motion seeking a second 
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period of retained jurisdiction after jurisdiction was relinquished at the end of his period 
of retained jurisdiction.  Id. at 185.  There, the defendant sought a second, consecutive 
retained jurisdiction which would have effectively extended the period of retained 
jurisdiction from 180 to 360 days.6  Id. at 186.  The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the 
district court lacked the authority to order a second period of retained jurisdiction without 
first placing the defendant on probation.  Id.  Once a court has retained jurisdiction for 
the statutory period, pursuant to the statute it may either relinquish jurisdiction or place 
the defendant on probation, or, in extraordinary circumstances, extend its jurisdiction for 
“a reasonable time” not exceeding thirty days.  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
Here, the district court did not allow jurisdiction to lapse, instead it affirmatively 
relinquished jurisdiction before jurisdiction would have automatically lapsed.  Notably, 
Mr. Flores did not ask for a new period of retained jurisdiction, he asked that he be 
allowed another chance to complete his rider.  (R., p.277.)  Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 motion 
and subsequent appeal were timely from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.  Should the 
district court have granted the Rule 35 motion, it could simply have vacated its previous 
order relinquishing and Mr. Flores would once again be placed in IDOC programming.  
He still had well over six months within the original period of retained jurisdiction in 
which he could have participated in a rider program.   
The district court erred in denying Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 motion because it believed 
it did not have the authority to order the remedy Mr. Flores requested. 
                                            
6 When the district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Gill, I.C. § 19-2601 provided that 
jurisdiction could be retained by the district court for up to 180 days.  Effective July 1, 
2010, the statute was amended to allow a district court to retain jurisdiction for up to 365 
days.  I.C. § 19-2601. 
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                                                           III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 Motion In Light 
Of The New Information Submitted In Support Of The Rule 35 Motion 
 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may 
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.  State v. Trent, 125 
Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).  “The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable.”  Id.  “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction.  Id.  “When presenting a Rule 35 
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion.”  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). 
The new information presented in support of Mr. Flores’ Rule 35 motion showed 
that pictures that were alleged to have been gang-related were sent in by family 
members and were mixed in with many other pictures; he worked out once with a group 
of individuals that were later alleged to be reinforcing gang activity and he did not 
deliberately do anything to reinforce gang activities on the rider; he used the PIN 
numbers of other inmates during a family emergency—his son was in the hospital; he 
was not involved in or aware of the assault and battery on the other inmate.  (R., p.276.)  
Mr. Flores had associated with certain individuals and IDOC officials removed 
Mr. Flores and several other individuals after the incident to conduct an investigation.  
(R., p.276.)  Thus, Mr. Flores’ programming was interrupted, and after “no definitive 
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information came forth implicating Mr. Flores” in gang activity or with involvement in the 
assault and battery of the other inmate, the district court received a recommendation for 
relinquishment of Mr. Flores’ jurisdiction.  (R., p.276; PSI, p.44.)  However, the IDOC 
report only equivocally recommended relinquishment, recommending: 
Mr. Flores would benefit from further treatment as he has yet to address 
the major features of his addiction and his criminal thinking due to early 
removal from the program as such he has a poor candidate for probation 
at this time. However, given another opportunity at treatment in a secure 
facility, he may finish his “Rider” and be a successful candidate for 
probation. 
 
(PSI, p.50) (emphasis added). 
   In light of Mr. Flores’s progress, the district court should have retained 
jurisdiction and placed him back in the custody of IDOC so that he could complete the 
rider programming. 
In light of the new information presented in support of his Rule 35 motion, 
Mr. Flores asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to reverse 




Mr. Flores respectfully requests that this Court remand his case with instructions 
allowing him the opportunity to complete a rider.  Alternatively, Mr. Flores requests that 
this Court remand his case and that he be placed on probation.  
DATED this 3rd day of October, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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